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The City Council of the City of San Anselmo has
established stop signs on ,Butterfield Road at the intersection
of said road with Meadowcroft Road, Arroya and Caletta
Avenues which requires traffic on Butterfield Road to stop at
each or these streets. These streets carry practically no
traffic, 
or so little traffic it is not necessa~ to maintain
stop signs on Butterfield Road to accommodate the traffic
from any of these streets. In fact although Arroya and
Caletta Avenues 'intersect Butterfield Road from the East
side only, stop signs are nevertheless maintained on the
West side of Butterfield Road at or near the intersection
In a conversation with three of theof these streets
councilmen of the city of San Anselmo, Knowles, Smith and
O'Mera each of these gentlemen advised that the stop signs
were established for the purpose of reducing the speed of
vehicles on Butterfield Road and not for the purpose of
facilitating vehicles entering Butterfield Road from these
streets, 
as each of them admitted that there was no necessity
for stop signs at the intersection of these streets with
Butterfield Road to permit traffic to enter Butterfield Road
from these streets.
Butterfield Road extends from Sir Francis Drake Blvd.
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to Sleepy Hollow a distance of one mile and the three streets
above mentioned intersect Butterfield Road within this distance.
The maintenance of the stop signs above mentioned
on Butterfield Road constitute a serious obstruction to travel
over this road as it reduces the 25 mile an hour speed limit
allowed by the state law for motor vehicles in residential
districts to approximately 10 miles an hour by forcing motor
vehicles to stop and start at each of these streets.
Since Butterfield Road is the only thoroughfare by
which people living in Sleepy Hollow can go to and from their
homes, 
the maintenance of these stop signs is a serious
detriment to the property owners in Sleepy Hollow and tends to
reduce the market value of their respective properties.
F r 
the foregoing reasons the property owners in
Sleepy Hollow desire to commence an action in the Superior
Court of 1~arin County to restrain the City of san Anselmo from
maintaining said stop signs
THE ORDINANCES OR RESOLUTIONS PROVIDING FOR THE
I.
ERECTION AND MAINTENANCE OF STOP SIGNS ON BUTTERFIELD
ROAD ARE IN CONFLICT WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE VEHICLE
CODE AND ARE THEREFORE INVALID.
IN GENERAL, MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES REGULATINGA.
THE USE OF CITY STREETS ARE INVALID IF THEY ARE IN CONFLICT WITH
STATE STATUTES ON THE SAME SUBJECT.
Decisions supporting this gener~l proposition are
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collected in 21 A.L.R. 1186, 64 A.L.R.
994, 
and 147 A.L.R. 523.
Section 11 of article XI~pf the California Constitution
provides:
II Any county, city, town, or township may make and en-
force within its limits all such local, police, sanitary, and
other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws."
(Emphasis added.) (Section 6 of article XI authorizes chartered
cities to ttmake and enforce all laws and regulations in respect
to municipal affairs .If
In Atlas Mixed Mortar Co. v. City of Burbank,
Gal. 
660, ordinances of the defendant city which regulated the
use of city streets by commercial vehicles of certain weights
were held void. The following portion of the opinion 1s
pert~nt here: "It is the contention of the respondents that
in so far as the state legislature has attempted by means of
said Motor Vehicle Act to prohibit municipalities from the
passage of laws regulating the weight of motor vehicles in the
course of their use and transport upon and along the streets
and highways, the provisions of said act are unconstitutional
as in vi0lation of the provisions of article XI, section 11,
of the state constitution. The theory of the respondents in
making this contention is that the control of streets and high-
ways for the purpose of regulating traffic thereon is a municipal
affair.
That this contention is without merit has been
cle  
by .recent decisions, wherein it has been held that
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the regulation and control of travel and traffic along
public roads, streets, and highways of the state of California,
if 
it ever was such, has ceased to be a matter of local concern
(T)he rule thus declared would have application to
municipalities formed under general laws, of which the
of Burbank is one, being a municipality of the sixth class.
The effect of these several decisions is to declare that when-
ever 
the state of California sees fit to adopt a general scheme
for 
the regulation and control of motor vehicles upon the public
highways of the state, the entire control over whatever phases
of the subject are covered by state legislation ceases in so far
as municj,pal or local regulation is concerned."" (202 Gal. at pp.
662-663.)
Other traffic ordinances of various kinds have been
that is, on the ground thatdeclared invalid for the same reason,
they were in conflict with specific state statutes or the general
statutory scheme with respect to the particular subject matter
(Pipo.ly v. Benson, 20 Gal. 2d 366; In re Murphy,
nvolved.
190 Ca1. 287; James v. Myers, 68 Ca1. App. 2d 23; Nosbonne v.
Brill,
53 Gal. App. 2d 436; People v. Huchstep, 114 00. App
Supp.769.)
LOCAL AUTHORITIES ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO FIX
.
MAXIMUM SPEED LIMITS FOR TRAFFIC ON STREETS IN RESIDENTIAL
DISTRICTS.
In the leading case of Ex Parte Daniels, 183 Cal. 636,
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the petitioner was charged with driving an automobile within
the city of Pasadena (a chartered city in violation of an
ordinance.fixing the maximum speed limit at less than that
prescribed by the Motor Vehicle Act then in effect. The
ordinance was held to be void under the following reasoning:
"(T)he regulation of traffic upon the streets of a
city is not one of those municipal affairs in which by the
constitution chartered cities are given a power superior to
that of the state legislature" but .such power is subject
to the general laws of the state, and ordinances inconsistent
183 
Ca1. at p~ 641.therewith are invalid."
Further, it was said (p. 642): "It was clearly the
intention of the legislature to declare that the limitation upon
speed fixed in the law shall be the only limitation controlling
the conduct of the driver of a motor vehicle upon the streets
The intent of the legislature inand highways of the state.
adopting this general scheme for the control of motor vehicles
upon the public highways of the st~te, for the collection of
licenses and the appropriation thereof to the improvement of
highways, 
is not to be measured alone by the language used, but
by the whole purpose and scope of the legislative scheme."
Similarl , 
an ordinance of the city of Merced setting a
maximum speed limit was declared void in Matter of Application of
ith, 
26 Ca1. App. 116, with this comment (pp. 123-124):
.its"Merced is a city of the sixth class and.
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authority goes no further than to 'make and enforce within
its limits, all such local, police, sanitary, and other
regulations as are not in conflict with general laws. (Const.,
art. 
XI, sec. 11)
It,therefore,
the Merced ordinance may be
said to con.flict with the Motor Vehicle Act or if this act can
reasonably be held to have been intended to supplant all other
legislation, 
state and local, with regard to the subject-matter
of the act, clearly the Merced ordinance must stand aside
In concluding that the ordinance in question did
conflict with the general law, the court stated: lIThe view
contended for by respondent would justify every municipality
in the state in passing and enforcing ordinances different
from the state law and different f'rom each other, thus placing
a most vexatious burden upon the users of our streets and
highways in compelling them to become familiar with all these
It seems to us that the legislature intended by the
statutes.
Motor Vehicle Act to avoid this possible confusion in the law
governing the speed of motor vehicles." 26 Gal. App. at p. 127.
49 Cal. App. 395,In Humphrey v. U.S. Macaroni Co.~
it was held error to admit in evidence certain sections of an
ord~nce of the city of Los Angeles, one section of which
Citing theprescribed speed limits for traffic on city streets.
p.398):
"We concede that thethe court saidDaniels case,
Motor Vehicle Act on the subject prevails over the ordinance and
tha t the provisions of the ordinance are invalid. 11
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Citing authorities from several states, the follow-
ing comment is made in 21 A.L.R. 1187:
"(A)s a general rule,
where an ordinance regulating the speed or motor vehicles
same subject, the ordinance is invalid." (Subsequent cases
The present section 511 of the Vehicle Code fixes the
prima facie speed limits under various conditions. Section 511-.3
provides that local authorities may alter prima facie speed
11mi ts- in two cases:
1) 
Under specified circumstances, a
limit of 25 miles per hour may be increased to 35 or 45 miles
per hour; 2) A 55 mile an hour limit may be decreased to 45
or 35 miles per hour under certain conditions. The prima facie
speed limit in residential districts is 25 miles per hour (Veh.
Code, 
sec. 511 (b)(l) and there is no authorization in the
Vehicle Code for ordinances low:ering such a limit. Having
given local authorities power to alter the limits fixed by
section 511 of two specific instances, the power to alter the
established limits in other respects by municipal ordinance
1s clearly excluded. In re Murphy, 190 Ca1. 286, 289. This
is also the import of section 458, which reads:
tIThe 
provisions of this division are applicable and
uniform throughout the State and in all counties and munici-
palities therein and no local authority shall enact or enforce
any ordinance on the matters covered by this division unless
~xEEe5~ll authorized herein." (Emphasis added.
-7-
It may be conceded that local authorities, I1within the
highways as stop intersections.
459(g), 
465
(Veh. 
Code, sees.
(b) .)
of traffic other than as prescribed in the Vehicle Code or
reduce the speed limit for vehicles in a residence district. As
stated in Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Gal. 2d 366, at 371:
"Regardless
of whether there is any actual grammatical conflict between an
ordinance and a statute, the ordinance is invalid if it attempts
to impose additional requirements in a field which is fully
occupied by the statute." This principle has been stated as
follows:
Iff/1oreover, it is held that penal ordinances, although
not actually conflicting with the general laws, must be in
harmony therewith in order to be valid." (.18 Ga.1. Jur. 94.1.)
(See, also, Ex Parte Kearny, 55 Gal. 212, 225, quoted in In re
71 Gal. App. 522, at 528-529.
Simmons,
The legitimate purpose of stop intersections is to
facilitate travel (Lindenbaum v. Barbour, 213 Gal. 277, 284)
not to impede it, and an ordinance, the sole purpose and effect
of which is to slow down traffic, is arbitrary, unreasonable and
an invalid attempt to lower the speed limits fixed by section 511
Where the ordinance is unreasonable,of the Vehicle Code.
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arbitrary, 
or discriminatory, the purpose for which it was
weight to such purpose in considering the validity of the
ordinance." (Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 u.s. 223, at 240.)
v. City of Oakland, 98 Cal. App. 165, where it was
said (pp. 167-168):
['In entering upon the inquiry as to the validity
of the ordinance we are, of course, mindful of the rule,
stressed by appellants, that every intendment and presumption
is in favor of its validity. But we have in mind, also, the
settled principle that lr a statute or ordinance 'purporting
to have been enacted to protect the public health, the public
morals, 
or the public safety has no real or substantial
relation to those objects' it is the duty of the courts to so
(Cit tions)djudge.
And in this i the courts
alone.
,
It is settled law that a plaintiff may show by extrinsic
evidence that a&ordinance, by reason of particular facts and
circumstances, is unreasonable, oppressive and void as to him
(Emphasis added.) (See, also, Pacific Palisades Assn., v. City
of Huntington Beach, 196 Gal. 211,216.
ENFORCEMENT OF THE INVALID ORDINANCES OR RESOLUTIONS MAY BE
ENJOINED.
As stated in Brock v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 2d 605,
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"i t has uniformly been he ld that one
609-610, 
citing cas~s,
specially interested may enjoin the attempted execution of
an unconstitutional statute." In conformity with this general
rule, one specially affected by an invalid traffic ordinance
may enjoin its enforcement. (Atlas Mixed Mortar Co v.City
of Burbank, 202 Gal. 660.)
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